

nutritional information

Hackers On Planet Earth	4
Life Under GTD5	6
The Joys of Voice Mail	12
Finger Follies	14
Cordless Fun	18
Admins Without a Clue	19
Hacking Prodigy	20
Hacking the Small Stuff	22
Letters	24
DTMF Decoder	32
Monitoring Keystrokes	38
2600 Marketplace	41
Facts	43
Detecting Corporate Leaks	44


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
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
part two

Germany Mexico



A set of German phone booths. Note the inevitable size of the handicapped booth.

Photo by Brian Man



Another card-only payphone.

Photo by YETI



Public card reader payphone in Tijuana.

Photo by Dan Hank

Aruba

Ecuador



Payphone in Ecuador.

Photo by Dan Hank

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"Our experience has found that the best way to hurt a computer offender is to take away his toys. Computers are expensive items, and young offenders in particular may be unable to replace them. The seizure of the offender's computer by police also immediately and dramatically brings home the consequences of computer crime in a way that inter-jurisdictional proceedings cannot match. The knowledge that the seized computer system will be retained by law enforcement hinders the realization that the offender must change his lifestyle." - Kenneth Koenigkraft from 'Deterring Computer Crime' as published in 'Prosecutor's Brief', Summer 1989

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Photo by RUEFAR

This phone on the Galapagos Islands is the reddest we've ever seen. Trust us, it really is red. A true red box. Really.

Photo by RUEFAR

Hackers On Planet Earth

It was a little less than a year ago that the idea of a major hacker event in the United States this summer was first expressed. The success of Hacking at the End of the Universe (HEU) in Holland led many people to ask why such an event couldn't occur in the United States. In our Autumn 1993 issue, we wondered if such a thing would ever happen here. But it wasn't until a couple of months ago that the enthusiasm here began to spread like an infectious disease. It's been a long time coming and this summer seemed like the perfect time. After all, it's our tenth anniversary and the hacker world is bigger than it's ever been.

And so, Hackers On Planet Earth (HOPE), the first-ever global hacker event to take place in this country, will be held in New York City on August 13 and 14. (Full registration info can be found on pages 13 and 47, as well as a special insert sent to all subscribers.) One way or another, history is liable to be made.

What exactly is a "global hacker event"? It's different from the various hacker conferences that take place in this country - Summercon, Def Con, and HohCon are all well worth attending and usually take place every year. The annual Hackers Conference that takes place in California might also be worthwhile - we can't seem to find any hackers who have ever been invited to it though. The 2600 People in the hacker community meetings in various cities are still more ways for hackers to get together, this time on a monthly

basis.

We believe HOPE will have

ingredients of all of these events but will also add something to the equation that just hasn't happened here yet. Hackers will work together for two days and nights and celebrate their existence in what has unfortunately become an often hostile environment. The general public will have a chance to see things from our perspective - the conference will take place in the middle of New York City and will be cheap enough for nearly anyone to attend. Seminars, talks, and workshops will take place around the clock in an open atmosphere. The uses and abuses of technology will be discussed - and demonstrated. A giant ethernet, similar to the one created at last year's HEU, will be constructed here (everyone is encouraged to bring a computer for maximum effect). This, along with our hookup to the Internet, will give many people their first taste of the net. And it will be hackers, not large corporations, leading the way.

An excellent example of what we intend to do was recently demonstrated on New York's WBAL-FM. During a fundraiser for this noncommercial radio station, listeners were offered a year of unrestricted Internet access on escape.com, a new Internet service

\$16.50 per month with no time limits, probably the cheapest net connection possible. You can connect at (212) 888-8212 or call the voice line at (212) 888-8780. New Yorkers jumped at the chance to get

true access to the net without having

to always watch the clock and pay

outrageous fees. In two hours,

escape.com brought 86 new people onto the net and raised \$3600 for a noncommercial radio station. This means something. There are swarms of people in our society who want to listen to what we are saying and who understand our spirit, if not our language. The hacker spirit has manifested itself in many of us but it lies dormant in a far greater number. If we have an opportunity to reach still more people, we should. Some won't understand but those who do could turn out to be very important to the hacker world. Only when the general public begins to see that there is far more to us than what they read in tabloids will their perception of us begin to change. And that could change everything.

It's always been in the interests of the phone companies and corporate online services to paint us in as evil a light as possible. Then they can continue to play by their rules, charging consumers as much as they want and not having anyone capable to challenge them. But a growing number of people are realizing that it's not as black and white as these entities want us to believe.

We've seen it happen twice in Holland. The United States is long overdue. But this isn't the only "Hacker Congress" happening this year. On October 7, 8, and 9, the "First International Congress about Viruses,

Hacking, and the Computer Underground" will take place in Buenos Aires, Argentina at the Centro Cultural Recoleta, Junin 1930 from 3 pm to 9 pm.

We're happy to learn that there is a thriving hacker culture there as well and we hope many Americans and Argentines attend both events.

According to the organizers, "the congress will be oriented to discuss subjects related to hacking, viruses, and the technology impact in the society of now and in the future. We will also have offering freedom to speak to all attendees, being from the 'bad' or 'good' side of the discussed issues. As we in Argentina don't yet have laws against hacking or virus writing or spreading, we think it is very important to discuss all those items as freely and deeply as possible." For more information, send email to: fernando@ubik.sarlink.net, Fidonet: 4.901/303, You can phone +54-1-654-0459 or fax +54-1-40-5110 or send paper mail to: Guemes 160, dto 2., Ramos Mejia (1714), Provincia de Buenos Aires, Republica Argentina. Admission to this event is, incredibly enough, totally free.

There are a lot of bad things we can focus on - the Clipper chip, increased surveillance, technological ripoffs, imprisoned hackers, and so much more. But there's also a great deal to be optimistic about. We've got the means to see things in different, non-traditional ways and, most importantly, share these perceptions with each other. This August, we'll have the chance to take that one step further. It may be the only hope we have.

foiling the finger command

by Packet Rat

The Finger command is a command that most systems on the Internet have. It allows anyone, anywhere on the Internet to get information on anyone else on the Internet. This has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side it allows people to leave messages about their whereabouts, phone numbers, etc. This also happens to be the negative side. Depending on how the system administrator configures "finger", info such as your phone number, address, full name, and what you are doing (i.e., what commands you are executing)

```
#!/bin/sh  
COUNTFILE=$HOME/.fingered      #Create variable to point to file that will  
expr `cat $COUNTFILE + 1 > $COUNTFILE` #increase COUNTFILE by 1  
echo "My privacy has been violated" > cat $COUNTFILE "times" #Nice Message  
echo  
case $2 in  
remote) echo "People from $1 sure are noisy!"  
echo $1 > /tmp/safehouse  
  
#Ansfruchtmall -s "REMOTE FINGER?" <UID> </tmp/safehouse  
#Send mail with reverse finger info  
#Add fingerer site name to file  
#Safehouse  
#Finger fingerer's site  
#Fingerer  
#Put fingerer site name in list of  
#fingers  
#That have fingered me  
#Who is running finger locally at the  
#time I'm being fingered. NOTE: grep  
#Finger can be replaced with:  
#grep finger <UID>  
  
echo "Hey `cat /tmp/spy` , stop poking around here!"  
#Time and Date stamp for finger mail  
finger -l > /tmp/fingerlog  
  
#Reverse log finger to get fingerer's  
#finger info. Append to mail file.  
#Mail me fingerer's finger info  
rm /tmp/fingerlog  
rm /tmp/spy >> /tmp/fingerlog  
#Add fingerer name to list of  
#fingers  
#Remove temp file  
#End case statement
```

are available to anyone (and you have no way

of knowing who has been poking around). As you may or may not know, information such as that stated above could adversely affect the Internet user. For example, with your name and phone number people could easily social engineer most college or company workers into giving out your address, Social Security number (oh no!), and other sensitive info. With your Social Security number, people can cause you BBS problems (that's another article). You may ask, "What can I do?" Well, here are some solutions:

(1) Change your Finger information. On most UNIX systems users can execute the command "chfn" (change finger info) or "passwd -r". By running "chfn" or "passwd -r" you can change your name, phone number, or any other bit of finger information. Note: Some system administrators disable these commands or options for security reasons.

(2) Modify your plan file. The plan file is a file that is related to the screen of the person fingerling you. So one thing you can do is create a plan full of empty lines (100 or so should do). This will have the effect of scrolling your finger info off the fingerer's screen. This works if the person is using a dumb terminal, but useless if he has scrollback on his terminal. You could link your plan file to a binary file such as /bin/false (in -s /bin/false .plan). This will display garbage characters and possibly make noises (now!) on the fingerer's system.

(3) If your UNIX system is running GNU finger (finger program written at MIT), you can copy the included script into a file called finger. The file ".fingered" is executed and output goes to stdout. This script will:
a) Keep track of how many times you were fingered.
b) Let you know who fingered you, or where you were fingered from.
c) Do a reverse finger on the fingerer or his site.
d) Let the fingerer know that you have his info.
e) Not give any of your info out (depends on how GNU finger is set up).
Change <UID> to your username. Also, you should change /tmp to a directory that is

writable by anyone and accessible from any system on your local net. Also create the finger in your home directory with a 0 in it.
<CTRL-D>

0

The fingered file and your home directory must have the read and execute permissions set so "others" have access. The fingered file should be writable by "others" also. This is necessary because GNU finger is run as user "nobody". If your system is set up so output is filtered through your finger, you can set up a series of "grep -v" pipes to filter out any info you do not want the world to see. Or you can just put "echo" by itself to display nothing. Another fun thing to do is use "finger -l <USER>" in your finger. This will have the effect of people seeing someone else's finger info instead of yours.

Note: It is possible to create a program that will kill all finger daemon processes as soon as they are started. This is due to the fact that since your finger script is run as user "nobody", all commands in it are run as "nobody"; just like the daemons finger processes. I urge you not to try this since your local system administrator would get quite mad.

(4) There are other things you can do to stop your finger script from running. You can either limit the number of finger info that goes out, but these require root (highest) access. As root you can do many things. Some options are:
a) Disable finger (not should work).
b) Use a "Wrapper" program to limit what info the finger daemon supplies.
c) Modify the finger source code (if available).

playing with your fingers

by Shishishi

Seems that a lot of people are asking questions about backfingering people over the internet who have been fingered them. I hope to explore the different options available to you in this article, and while not divulging much source code, at least offer a few ideas that should give the dos explorer hardly any trouble developing a safe and efficient backfinger device. What's the point? Well, you probably have been "explored" a few systems lately and have

no doubt caught the attention of the system administrator's eye (or one of his staff...), that is, if he cares. You should have probably no doubts that if you've been telefing to port 25 of the same box frequently, that the sysadmin has been looking at your trail. In my case, I get fingered by sysadmins that I don't even know, but they keep checking the wrong account like I'd really do anything from my university account. Another good thing about longing fingers - it teaches a very important part of UNIX education: that being socket

Hacking the SMALL Stuff

by Leonardo Branișton

I've always been a hacker. When I was in third grade, the math tests that my class would be subjected to had the answers at the bottom of the page, encrypted with a simple substitution cipher. The code changed from week to week. Rather than work the whole quiz, I'd just do the first few problems, double check them carefully, then crack the code, and fill out the rest of the quiz in no time. Sometimes I'd even pass the code along to the other kids.... Wasn't this a whole lot harder than just doing the arithmetic? Of course it was. The cost-benefit ratio was definitely not in my favor, but I just had to figure this stuff out. And if it's that spirit of inquiry that is, to me, what hacking is all about.

This article won't give the details on the latest switches the RBOCs are installing, nor will it tell how to reverse-engineer your cellular phone. In fact, most of the hacks I'm about to describe are quite obsolete. What I hope does well do, though, is illustrate some of the thought processes that go into hacking, and show how a hacker should always take time to play with technology, and be constantly alert to the little details that most other people overlook.

Automatic Teller Machines

There are several different varieties of ATM's. On the version at my old bank, I always played around, trying different sequences of keypresses whenever I used it. I found that if, at the end of my first transaction, I requested "another" transaction, then immediately pulled my card out of the slot before the machine could suck it back in, the machine would lower the window that protected its display, and a little red "CLOSED" sign would pop up. The machine would then stay down for about five minutes, as it began clicking and cycling each component (envelope slot, bill counter, etc.) in sequence. Presumably, it was performing some sort of diagnostic self-test. Five minutes later, the sign would switch back to "OPEN", and the ATM would resume its usual behavior.

After a couple of years, the firmware on

these machines got revved, and this trick no longer worked. But I still try doing weird things during ATM transactions, just to see what else I might discover. If it eats my card, well, it'll arrive in my mail a week or two later....

Old Calculators

When I was in high school, calculators were rather large things with LED displays that are barely like crazy. I had a Texas Instruments TI-30 calculator that did little more than square root, reciprocal, and trig functions. All the keys were arranged in a standard rectangular matrix, one where each key, when pressed, closed a circuit between one vertical and one horizontal wire. This kind of arrangement of course precludes any meaningful decoding when multiple keys are pressed simultaneously.

One day, while drumming my fingers

around on the calculator (which was turned off), some LED segments lit up! Intrigued, I started experimenting. The ON/CLEAR and OFF buttons were part of the same matrix as the rest of the keys. Of course, with the power off, there would be no way for the ON/CLEAR key to be detected, so it was wired to an additional circuit. This meant, though, that the separate circuit could be triggered, not only by pressing the ON/CLEAR key, but by pressing any combination of keys that would complete a circuit between the row and column of the ON/CLEAR key. In fact, the OFF key worked the same way. So now I could turn my calculator on and off without touching the ON and OFF keys.

That was nifty but utterly worthless, so I'll move on to a more interesting calculator: the Sharp EL-512. I bought this one several years after the TI-30. It had an LCD display, and all kinds of useful functions, like two-variable statistics, programmability, Y. It could, of course, be used for other things, such as recalling the last intermediate value in a series of calculations after the final result was noted.)

Here's an example: With the display reading "55005500", the result would be "55E550". With a display of "999C981" and an accumulator value of 9000939, the result would be "CoolCAL".

And so on. Not of any practical value, but amusing... I kept a small slip of paper with that calculator, listing all of the characters I could produce with this method, both upright and inverted. Upfront, I could recognizeably generate versions of: ACCEFHIIInLhpqrzuZ.

Here is what I found. When a decimal-to-hex conversion is performed, the EL-512 checks to make sure that the number is not already expressed in hex. (This calculator produces the current method of hex conversion, which is to have a separate mode for each base: "hex mode", etc.) If the number is already in hex, no conversion is performed. When the conversion occurs in a program, however, no such check is made, and the jumbled-up screen resulted from attempting to convert to hex a number that was already expressed in hex.

The line segments on the top half of the display were consistent: they were the upper four segments of the number which had been previously displayed. The bottom segments, though, depended on the calculations which had gone before. Eventually I determined them to be dependent only upon the value in the accumulator register. These segments would be activated as follows:

Starting from the third digit of the number in the accumulator, each bit in that digit would correspond to a segment in the lower part of the digit on the display (starting from the first digit on the display, so only the six segments of the last two digits could be controlled).

Getting the desired value into the accumulator was trivial: the EL-512 had a key marked with a double-headed arrow, pointing up and down. Its function was to swap the value in the display register with the value in the accumulator register. Its intended use was to enter ordered pairs of values for the two-variable statistics: you would enter X, press this button to store X in the accumulator, then enter Y. It could, of course, be used for other things, such as recalling the last intermediate value in a series of calculations after the final result was noted.)

Here's an example: With the display containing "55005500", the result would be "55E550". With a display of "999C981" and an accumulator value of 9000939, the result would be "CoolCAL".

And so on. Not of any practical value, but amusing... I kept a small slip of paper with that calculator, listing all of the characters I could produce with this method, both upright and inverted. Upfront, I could recognizeably generate versions of: ACCEFHIIInLhpqrzuZ.

The upside down character set I'll leave as an exercise for the reader....

Vending Machines

Hacking vending machines and other coin op devices is a whole topic unto itself. But this example illustrates the chain of reasoning that led to my discovery of the hack.

There is a type of vending machine which has items stacked in metal spirals. When you

make your selection, the spiral wire turns one full revolution, effectively screwing a single package (candy bar, bag of chips, or whatever) off the end, dropping it into the hopper below.

Nowadays, most of these machines have a panel where you must specify the row and column of your choice, but earlier versions of these machines simply had one button per selection.

The machine in the office where I worked was of the latter type, and had two separate banks of buttons, about 20-25 buttons on each. Now, I found myself wondering why the buttons had been separated into two separate banks. The separation was not really significant enough to be helpful in locating your selection, and they did not seem to have any logical separation between them, either. I concluded that they were pair into two separate banks because of some internal limitation, some circuit that could only read one bank of buttons at a time, something like that.

I had already tried putting my money into

the machine, then simultaneously pressing two buttons in the same bank. It was simply a race: whichever button closed first would determine the selection I got. But now I tried pressing two corresponding buttons, one in each bank, at the same time. Since enough, as long as I had just enough coins to cover the more expensive of the two items, BOTH coils would turn, and I'd get two sodas for the price of one.

In Conclusion

I see many people asking, in letter columns, on the net, on BBS's, the same question: "How can I become a hacker?" The answer, of course, is always the same: experiment, play around, try to figure out for yourself just how the technology works. But hacking isn't just phones and computers; the same process can be applied to the smaller stuff that we come into contact with every day. Never miss an opportunity to practice your hacking skills!

dtmf decoder

by Paul Bergman

In the Spring 94 issue of 2600, Xem Kliney described a circuit that decodes DTMF touch tone signals and transmits that information to a Commodore 64 or VIC-20 computer. This article expands on that by detailing how to interface a simple DTMF decoder circuit to an IBM-compatible computer via its parallel port. Since IBM-compatibles comprise the vast majority of existing computers, this solution is fairly universal. Information contained in this article was taken from my new book, *Control the World With Your Computer*.

If you don't already own an IBM-compatible computer, older PCXT and AT-type computers are often available for under \$100 at hamfests, auctions, etc. Far from being obsolete, many uses can be found for those inexpensive and ubiquitous computers. This article describes in detail a simple circuit and software that will monitor a telephone line, decode all DTMF signals, and log the data to a computer. It will even decode the A, B, C, and D "Silver Box" tones used by telcos, the military, ham radio operators, and COCOTS (Customer-Owned Coined-Operated Telephones).

Theory. DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency) tones, or touch tones, etc., as their name implies, are composed of a pair of audio sine waves. There are eight distinct frequencies (four rows and four columns) ranging from 697 to 1633 cycles-per-second (Hertz). The two frequencies that intersect on a 4x4 matrix make up each of the 16 DTMF tones: 0, 9, *, #, A, B, C, and D. The fourth column (1633 Hz) isn't used on consumer telephones, but is used on the U.S. military's AUTOVON telephone network to designate routing priority. As just mentioned, it is also used internally by some telcos, ham radio repeater systems, and some COCOTs for maintenance purposes.

Touch tone signals were developed by the Bell System over 30 years ago for inband telephone signalling. The audio frequencies were carefully chosen to avoid harmonic interference and false triggering by voice signals. The signalling format is so effective that applications for it expanded far beyond the scope they were intended for. Voice mail, audiotex, paging, and data entry/retrieval

systems are some examples.

You can input data collected from a remote location to your computer over a twisted pair. DTMF signals can even be transmitted over the airwaves via an inexpensive FM transmitter, received with a matching FM receiver, and decoded by your computer. Working in reverse, I have used a DTMF-modulated FM transmitter/receiver pair to control a small robotic vehicle with my computer.

Not too many years ago, one had to painstakingly construct and align a separate circuit to decode each Touch-Tone. No more. Several companies now manufacture DTMF decoder IC chips designed to decode, filter, and convert all DTMF signals to binary numbers. Basically, you plug audio containing DTMF tones in one end, and get a binary number out the other. The IC does all the work. The circuit illustrated here is based on the popular 43270 DTMF decoder chip.

The Circuit

Figure 1 shows a circuit for decoding DTMF signals and interfacing them to an IBM-compatible computer via its parallel printer port. Nearly all parts can be purchased at Radio Shack or from Digi-Key (see parts list). Construction layout is not critical, and the circuit can be laid out and soldered on a Radio Shack project board. You may want to solder DIP sockets for the two IC chips on the board and plug the chips in later to prevent thermal damage from soldering. Because of their low cost, (about \$10.00) a second parallel port card is recommended for your PC instead of repeatedly swapping your printer cable.

Rather than reinvent the wheel and design my own phone line interface from scratch, I used Radio Shack's 43-236 "Telephone Recording Control" (\$24.95). This handy device provides microphone-level audio from the phone line and an electronic switch closure in response to an "offhook" condition. Drawing its power from the phone line, it is FCC-approved for direct connection to the dial-up network and can be attached anywhere along the phone line - from the telephone itself all the way back to the central office switch. An RJ11 coupler, RJ11-to-spade cable, and alligator clips make the connection a snap.

The "REMOTE" plug, (designed to activate




FIGURE 1: DTMF DECODER VIA PARALLEL PRINTER PORT

a tape recorder via its remote control jack) can be used to signal the computer that a phone is off the hook. The "MIC" plug is wired to the 8870's pin 2 input. The 8870's inactive high S-line (pin 15) will go to active low each time a valid DTMF signal (dgt) has been decoded. The SI line is wired to the printer port's ACK line at pin 10. The computer waits for the ACK line to rise to an active low. When it does, the DTMF conversion is read at the parallel printer ports' ERROR, SELECT, PAPER-END, and BUSY lines as binary bits. Software then decodes those 4-bit codes and writes them to RAM.

Because the 8870 is a CMOS IC chip, its outputs are rated for operating only one low-power TTL load. The 4049 inverting hex buffer is designed to allow low-power CMOS signals to sink TTL power levels. Its inclusion provides more reliable circuit operation if your interface cable is over six inches long. With the 4049, the connecting cable can be up to six feet long. If you require a longer cable (up to ten feet), you can add a pull-up resistor between each of the 4049's buffer outputs and +5 volts. This means you would connect a 4.7K ohm resistor between +5 volts and pins 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 15 on the 4049 inverting hex buffer chip.

Switch S1 is optional, but it facilitates tapping intercepted cordless and cellular telephone DTMF signals from a scanner's earphone jack. Take the mini "MIC" plug from the Radio Shack recording controller and

insert it into your scanner's earphone jack (a Y-adapter permits simultaneous monitoring).

Disconnect the recording controller's submit "REMOTE" plug from the decoder and install a SPST toggle switch between R4 and ground.

Closing S1 generates the strobe signal required by the software. The computer thinks the phone is off-hook, and starts writing binary DTMF values to memory. When S1 is released, the DTMF digits are logged to a disk file which is time and date-stamped.

Alternatively, you could record touch tones directly off a phone line with the recording control and a small tape recorder and decode them later by replaying them into your decoder/computer. Likewise, you could record touch tones off the air from cordless or cellular telephones with your scanner by connecting an attenuating cable between the scanner's earphone jack and the recorder's microphone jack. You can monitor the recording in real time with an earphone

and a tape hiss, and may not always decode accurately. Your tape recorder should have two alkaline batteries or run off an AC adapter. For optimum decoding results, you may have to adjust your scanner or tape recorder's volume control (try midway first) when playing the audio back into the decoder.

The Software

DTMF2PBM.BAS is a QBasic program that logs all DTMF tones decoded off a phone line. The program opens a file on your A:^{:\} drive, named "DTMF(date).DAT". For example, if the date is 07/04/1994, the program opens a file named "A:DTMF0704.DAT". Each time the phone is picked up (or S1 is closed), all subsequent DTMF tones are decoded and stored in RAM. When the call is completed and the phone hangs up, the data is saved as a record in the file: "A:DTMF0704.DAT". Each new line of the file begins with a time-stamp in 24-hour format (00:00:00). A ten second pause between digits will log a single "P" to indicate a pause, and a two minute pause or touch tones starts a single new file. If you turn your computer off, and then back on later that day, any new DTMF records will be added to the end of the "A:DTMF0704.DAT" file (assuming the TSR is loaded.) Each day, the program creates a new file and logs all of that day's DTMF traffic into it.

TSR Software

(Terminate-and-Stay-Resident)

The parallel printer port's ACK line was carefully chosen to input the STROBE signal. On all IBM-compatible parallel ports, the ACK line can be used as a hardware interrupt. Instead of realassing your computer solely as a DTMF logger, you can have it do the job in the "background". With TSN software, the computer can stop whatever it's doing and jump to special instructions whenever the ACK line is brought to logic high. This means your computer could be executing other tasks, then stop everything whenever the ACK pin is brought to logic high and record the time and date-stamped DTMF data to a disk file. When ACK returns low, the PC will return to the original task it was performing.

Writing a hardware interrupt-driven TSR is not a trivial matter, and is impractical in

BASIC. I have written many TSRs in Pascal and C, and have devoted an entire chapter of my book to the subject. The compiled and executable TSR software with over 400 lines of source code is included on the program disk supplied with the book.

Applications

You could use this system as a "pan-register" to log all phone numbers called from a particular telephone line. For example, if you share a phone line with roommates this could be very helpful in resolving billing disputes by documenting all line usage. Since all touch tones are logged in the computer, account numbers could be assigned to each caller and dates after each phone number to distinguish callers.

An attorney or other "professional" who bills clients by the minute could use this system to document billable phone time. By entering each client's account number with touch tones after the start of every telephone call (including billable time), a record could be kept for accounting purposes and printed out later.

A law-enforcement officer could attach an FM phone line transmitter (such as the DECO WTT-20) to any point along a phone line to transmit the audio to a remote FM receiver hundreds of feet away. The earphone output of a portable radio or FM walkman could be fed to the decoder's input jack through an attenuating cable, and a laptop PC employed to remotely log all DTMF traffic decoded from that phone line.

If desired, a miniature voice-activated tape recorder connected between the attenuating cable and the decoder's input (through a Y-adapter) could record voice traffic to facilitate subsequent correlation of DTMF recordings. A recording FM walkman or portable stereo with a tape recorder could also be used. An earphone plugged into the tape recorder would allow real time audio supervision. The entire system would fit easily inside a shoulder bag or briefcase for portability.

Any such connections to or monitoring of DTMF or voice traffic on a payphone, Change-A-Cell, COCOI, law-enforcement, or security-related phone line is definitely not encouraged by the author. Consult a qualified attorney to determine the legality of pen-register and telephone call recorder usage in your area. Unauthorized reception of cellular (not cordless) radiotelephone transmissions is a violation of federal law.

Parts List

Components Available at Radio Shack:

Telephone Recording Control, 43-228, \$24.95
RJ11-to-Spade-Lug Cable, 278-301, \$1.99
Abutting Patch Cable, 42-2152, \$3.49
16-Pin DIP Socket, 278-1868, \$3.89
DB25M Connector, 278-1547, \$1.49
Alligator Clips, 270-396, \$1.79
10K capacitors, 272-109, \$1.89
100K resistors, 271-1547, \$3.49
4.7K resistor, 271-1530, \$4.49
300K resistor, 271-1315, \$4.49
Project Board, 270-223, \$4.39
RJ11 Coupler, 278-358, \$2.49
SPST switch, 275-624, \$2.39
V-Adapter, 274-310, \$2.39
C9-K9v (200) 344-4539
3.679 MHz Crystal, CX049, \$1.43
4049 Inverting Hex Buffer, CD4049SUBE, \$4.47
5VDC Regulated Power Supply, EPS128-ND, \$33.75

Other Components:
8870 DTMF Touch Tone Decoder Chip, from the author, \$2.00 postpaid.
Wireless Telephone Transmitter, WTT-20, DECO Industries (914) 232-3878, \$29.95
(* Optional)
Complete specifications and application notes for the 8870 DTMF decoder chip are available free from Telexon Corporation (800) 426-3926. Ask for their Telecom Design Solutions Component Data Book.

Available From The Author

The author can supply the following items:
A) Control The World With Your Computer, Iron-Hight Text Publishers, \$29.95
B) A fully assembled and tested DTMF decoder circuit board, complete with QBasic and compiled Pascal .EXE software for TSB operation. The board includes sockets for connecting directly to a Radio Shack 43-236 telephone recording control, a DB25M connector for connection to an IBM parallel printer port, and a 5VDC power supply, all for \$50.00 (plus \$5.00 shipping).
C) An 8870 DTMF Decoder Chip alone, for \$6.00 postpaid.
D) A compiled and ready-to-run .EXE program that operates the circuit in Figure 1 as a TSR, for \$5.00 postpaid (specify diskette format).
The author will reply to any reasonable technical questions; if you enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope, address all correspondence to: Paul Bergman, 521 E. Wynnewood Road, Monroe, NJ 07640.

HOW CORPORATE LEAKS ARE DETECTED

by Parity Check

Everyday in the news we see a new government or corporate scandal which has been leaked to the press. During this time, the corporate spooks are usually trying to figure out who has leaked the memo to the press in the first place. This practice has developed into an art.

The first step involves finding out who had access to the information inside the organization. A list of names is then compiled and those persons are targeted by the security team.

One method used by security personnel to stop documents from being passed around is to put them on restricted distribution lists. These are lists of names or positions that are authorized to view and/or access the document. If you aren't on the list, you don't get the document.

This has a dual effect: first, the document is restricted, making it harder for the opponent to get the document. Second, should the document be leaked to the media or opponents, security officers will have a ready made list of suspects to start their investigation from.

Once a leak has occurred, the investigation team will attempt to locate the source of the leak by using multiple techniques such as interrogation, background screening, motives,

etc. These are all beyond the scope of this document and should be looked up in other publications (DOD Technical Journals, etc.). I will deal here with setting up traps for the sources to reveal itself and the possible countermeasures that may be used.

One method to find leakers in an organization is to set up other restricted distribution lists from the original list. In each case a segment of the original list will be used until all of the individuals are listed on different lists in a unique combination.

Then each of the lists are fed tool - forged documents that the target would want to leak - and then the source is found by cross-referencing the documents that are actually leaked with the distribution lists.

This method has its problems. It's time consuming because of the forgeries which need to be created and because of the lists required. Furthermore, the source will in most cases become suspicious when multiple lists are created and when "tool" starts appearing in above-average quantities. Also, nothing guarantees that the source will leak all of the documents sent to it.

Another method used is the creation of "mouse-trap" documents, tailor-made to catch the source. The original document is fed into a computer along with a thesaurus. The

computer then uses synonyms to replace some words in the document. Punctuation, placement of commas, etc.) is also altered as is the header style and the spaces between paragraphs. Using a combination of these techniques, a unique document is made for each person it is to be sent to, while keeping the essence of the message intact. Should the source discuss the message with another person on the document's distribution list, suspicion is not aroused as the central idea remains the same.

Then, the document is released to the individuals. Should the document be shown on television or published in the newspaper, the security officers will be able to determine who leaked the document. However, the media have caught on to this and some only quote part of the document. Here again, because of the wording and punctuation, the source can be found. In some corporations and government entities, this process is automated top to bottom, a new version of the document created each time it is requested. Of course, this technique has its limits as the source can always steal a colleague's copy and leak that version of the document.

A possible countermeasure is the complete reversal of the process - use a thesaurus and again change the punctuation. In this manner, regardless of what was planted inside the document, provided it is not shown in a picture, nothing can be traced back to the original copy.

The last technique is essentially a watered-down version of the above. Studies or

documents are released in massive quantities to the individuals, but each with a small discrepancy (typo, figures off by \$54, wrong date, etc.).

The information in the document is low-level while still being confidential. The theory, not always truthful, behind the technique is that someone willing to leak large quantities of low-level information will also be willing to leak high-level information. The process is repeated several times until a pattern can be isolated from an individual.

In conclusion, there are several techniques each with their strong points and weaknesses. The best possible solution to finding a leak within an organization is probably some hybrid of all of them.

Thursday, The 7th of April 1994
Document revision 1.0

Getting ready to fax us a secret document?

WAIT!
We have a new fax number:

(516) 474-2677

Who knows, it may even spell something

How corporate leaks are detected

by Parity Check

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